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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTION LAW--PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION-
COMMENT UPON REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO BLOOD TEST.-In an
automobile negligence action, defendant objected to plaintiff's at-
tempt to infer that defendant was under the influence of intoxi-
cants at the time of the accident by use of a state trooper's testi-
mony that defendant refused to submit to a blood test after she was
taken to a hospital as allowed by Ky. REv. STAT. 189.520 [here-
inafter referred to as KRS]. Section 2 of this statute prohibits
operation of a vehicle on a highway by a person under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor; section 4 provides for test of a de-
fendant's blood, fixes standards, and suggests presumptions which
might arise from various percentages of alcohol found in the
blood; and section 6 says that a person may not be compelled to
submit to such tests as specified in section 4, but that his re-
fusal to submit to such a test may be commented upon at the trial.
Held: section 6 of KRS 189.520 is unconstitutional under
section 11 of the constitution of Kentucky and the fifth amend-
ment as incorporated in the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution. Hovious v. Riley, 403 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1966).
This apparently is the first case in any state to hold that com-
ment upon a defendant's refusal to submit to an intoxication test
is unconstitutional when a state statute has expressly provided
such evidence to be admissible.' As such it is particularly im-
portant.
The Court disposed of the issue of the extension of the im-
munity rule against self-incrimination to civil cases by reference
to two previous Kentucky cases which approved such an ex-
tension to proceedings in which testimony is to be taken and the
fact asked could lead to possible criminal prosecution.
The Court in Hovious relied heavily upon Griffin v. Cali-
I Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 370, 373, n.4 (1963). "There appears to be no case in
which such provisions for the admissibility of evidence of a defendant's refusal
to permit an intoxication test have been held unconstitutional."
2 "Accordingly, it was early declared, and has been universally held, that
the privilege against self-incrimination may be asserted as of right in any
ordinary civil case. Further, that to bring a person within the exemption it is not
necessary that his examination as a witness should be had in the course of a penal
or criminal prosecution or that such should have been commenced and be
actually pending. It is sufficient if there is a law creating the offense under which
the witness may be prosecuted." Akers v. Fuller, 312 Ky. 502, 504, 228 S.W.2d
29, 31 (1950); Kindt v. Murphy, 312 Ky. 395, 401, 227 S.W.2d 895, 898
(1950).
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fornia,3 which applied the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Griffin held that section 13, article I of the California constitution,
which provides that "in any criminal case, whether the defendant
testifies or not, his failure to explain or deny by his testimony any
evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon
by the court and by counsel and may be considered by the court or
the jury," was unconstitutional as a violation of the fifth amend-
ment. In Griffin the defendant did not take the stand at the trial.
The jury was instructed that it could consider such failure as
indicating the truth of evidence which had been given against him
and which he could be reasonably exepcted to deny or explain
because of facts within his knowledge. The Griffin Court said that
what the jury may infer, given no help from the court is one
thing, but what it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence
of the accused into evidence against him is quite another.
4
One month after the Hovious decision the United States Su-
preme Court decided Schmerber v. California,5 and the Hovious
case must be re-evaluated in light of it. In Schmerber the de-
fendant was arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for
injuries suffered in an accident involving the automobile that he
had apparently been driving. The arresting officer, upon probable
cause, directed a physician to take a blood sample from defendant
despite his refusal, on advice of counsel, to consent thereto. After
an adverse decision below, defendant appealed on the grounds of
denial of due process, denial of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, denial of his right to counsel, and denial of his right not
to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures.6 Rejecting
all of these claims, the Court held in regard to the self-incrimina-
tion charge "that the privilege protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the
State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and
3380 U.S. 609 (1965).
4 Id. at 614.
5384 U.S. 757 (1966).
6 Since self-incrimination is the crux of the Kentucky Court of Appeals' hold-
ing in the Hovious case, no discussion of the due process, right to counsel, or
search and seizure claims is made in this comment. However, this does not mean
Kentucky defendants should overlook these arguments, and it would be wise to
read both the majority and dissenting opinions in Schmerber concerning these
issues.
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that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question
in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends."7 (Empha-
sis added.) In so holding, the Court places the taking of a blood
sample in the same category as fingerprinting, photographing,
measurements, writing or speaking for indentification, appearing
in court, standing, assuming a stance, walking, or making a parti-
cular gesture."
While Schmerber is not concerned with comment at the trial,
it does put compulsory blood tests taken under reasonable condi-
tions outside the privilege against self-incrimination. Since the
Kentucky Court of Appeals' theory in Hovious v. Riley for not al-
lowing comment was to prevent the privilege from losing its ef-
fectiveness, it seems that the old maxim "if the reason behind the
rule fails, so fails the rule," might apply here. As the privilege no
longer exists, should the rule remain?
But a conclusion along these lines may not be safe. The Su-
preme Court in its discussion of self-incrimination in Schmerber
v. California says in a footnote:
Petitioner has raised a similar issue in this case, in connection
with a police request that he submit to a "breathalyzer" test
of air expelled from his lungs for alcohol content. He refused
the request, and evidence of his refusal was admitted in evi-
dence without objection. He argues that the introduction of
this evidence and a comment by the prosecutor in closing
argument upon his refusal is ground for reversal under Grif-
fin v. California, 880 U.S. 609. We think general Fifth Amend-
ment principles, rather than the particular holding of Grif-
fin, would be applicable in these circumstances, see Miranda
v. Arizona, ante, at 468, n.37. Since trial here was conducted
after our decision in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, making those
principles applicable to the States, we think petitioner's
contention is foreclosed by his failure to object on this ground
to the prosecutor's question and statements. 9
The question of commenting upon defendant's refusal to submit
to an intoxication test was squarely before the Court. However,
the Court disposes of this issue on the procedural grounds of fail-
ure to object rather than deciding the substantive issue. The Court
seems to eliminate the possibility of any reliance upon the specif-
7 384 U.S. 757, 761.
8Id. at 764.
9 Id. at 765.
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ic holding of Griffin v. California° as was done by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals. When the Supreme Court said in Schmerber
that "We think general Fifth Amendment principles ... would be
applicable in these circumstances . . " did it mean the no-com-
ment rule might apply in situations other than those covered by
the privilege against self-incrimination? If the Court's intention is
not to apply the no-comment rule in cases where the privilege does
not exist, why did it indicate the Griffin case was inapplicable?
Seemingly the Supreme Court was directing us to the answer by
its reference to Miranda v. Arizona,"' where it said:
In accord with this decision, it is impermissible to penalize
an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
when he is under police custodial interogation. The prosecu-
tion may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood
mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.
But this only reiterates the position that, if the privilege exists,
you may not comment upon the exercise of the privilege. It does
not answer the question which was before the Court, i.e., if the
privilege against self-incrimination does not exist, may there
nevertheless be some circumstances in which the no-comment
rule would apply?
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in its discussion under the
constitution of Kentucky, referred to KRS 421.225 (1), which
reads in part: "In any criminal or penal prosecution the defen-
ant, on his own request, shall be allowed to testify in his own be-
half, but his failure to do so shall not be commented upon or
create any presumption against him." The Court reasoned that
this provision gives force to the self-incrimination clauses of the
Kentucky12 and United States' 3 constitutions and that the prohi-
bition against comment upon a person's failure to testify was
enacted "in order that the amendment not be denied its effective-
ness."
Such reasoning apparently presumes that blood tests, which
are non-testimonial in nature, are within the privilege against
10 880 U.S. 609.
11884 U.S. 486, 468, n.87 (1966).
S12"He cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself." Ky. CONST.§ 11.
aa "No person.. . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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self-incrimination under section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.
But are they? A 1960 Kentucky Attorney General's opinion,
citing case authority, indicates that section 11 of the constitu-
tion applies only to testimonial compulsion. 14 It seems strange that
the Court would expand this constitutional privilege to non-
testimonial blood tests without any discussion of why it was doing
so. Of course, if it so desires, the Court could interpret section 11
of the Kentucky constitution, as expanded by KRS 421.225, to
provide a broader coverage than the United States Constitution
does. However, its failure to discuss this apparent extension to
non-testimonial blood tests leaves the issue in a state of un-
certainty.
Another important aspect of this case is the possibility of one
party shielding himself from civil liability through use of the
privilege. It is argued in support of the no-comment rule that it
prevents putting a penalty upon the exercise of a constiutional
privilege. However, in civil cases this privilege given to one party
works as a distinct disadvantage to the other, whose just cause of
action may fail due to the lack of the blood test. In criminal cases
society as a whole bears the burden, but in civil cases the indivi-
dual would bear the entire burden. Since commenting upon the
exercise of the privilege in a civil case does not incriminate the
defendant in any way, should not the Court weigh the need for
augmenting the constitutional privilege through use of the no-
comment rule against the harm suffered by the individual in the
civil suit?
It must be inferred that only that part of KRS 189.520 (6)
allowing comment is rendered invalid, in spite of the Court's state-
ment in Hovious that "we are compelled to hold that subsection
(6) of KRS 189.520 is unconstitutional and of no effect." This
language appears to completely invalidate KRS 189.520 (6), but
such an inference would lead to an absurd result. The Court is ap-
14 "The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in a decision rendered in the case of
Elmore v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 448, 138 S.W.2d 956 (1940), affirmed the
general rule that the constitutional provision against self-incrimination consti-
tutes a limitation as to testimonial compulsion directed against a witness and
that, in that case, the taking of a man's shoes to compare with fooprints found at
the scene of a crime did not violate that person's constitutional right against self-
incrimination." Ky. Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 60-1181 (1960). This opinion is concerned
with photographing and fingerprinting of an arrested person. It concludes they
are not privileged because not testimonial. It is interesting to note that
Schmerber places blood tests in this same category.
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parently placing blood tests within the privilege against self-in-
crimination, and it would, by invalidating KRS 189.520 (6) en-
tirely, be sweeping away the section which allows the defendant to
refuse to take the test. This would leave the statute mandatory,
and such is presumably not the Court's intention. On the other
hand, in invalidating only the comment portion of section 6, the
Court renders KRS 189.520 completely ineffective as far as the
blood tests are concerned. The statute now provides for blood
tests, but the defendant is allowed to refuse to submit to the test.
Obviously, anyone who will be adversely affected by the test will
refuse to take it.
The important question is, of course, what is the present value
of Hovious? The Schmerber decision has undermined the Ken-
tucky Court's reliance upon the Griffin case. The Kentucky Court
was ambiguous in its failure to discuss whether it had extended its
privilege to cover non-testimonial blood tests and in its failure to
spell out specifically the extent that KRS 189.520 (6) has been in-
validated. It is difficult to forecast what influence the Schmerber
arguments will have upon the Kentucky Court in its consideration
of whether blood tests fall within the state's self-incrimination
clause. Considering these factors, it becomes difficult to believe
much weight will be given to the decision. This writer believes
the Kentucky Court will completely re-evaluate its position if this
issue arises again; therefore, Kentucky attorneys faced with this
problem should argue as though it were a completely open ques-
tion.
John T. Mandt
